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Abstract  
Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence 
local privatization. Variables related to fiscal stress, cost reduction, 
political processes and ideological attitudes are the most common 
explanatory variables used in these studies. In this paper, we add to 
this literature by examining the influence of transaction costs and 
political factors on local governments’ choices through new 
variables. In addition to this, we consider the role of additional 
aspects, such as intermunicipal cooperation as a potential alternative 
to privatization in order to exploit scale economies or scope 
economies. We consider two relevant services: solid waste collection 
and water distribution. Results from our estimates show that 
privatization (that is, contracting out to a private firm) is less 
common for water distribution than for solid waste collection. Higher 
transaction costs in water distribution are consistent with this finding. 
Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling 
party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of 
the constituency. This shows that those political interests able to 
influence local elections are more important in determining the form 
of delivery than is the basic ideological stance of the constituency. 
Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation is an alternative to 
local privatization. 
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Local privatization, intermunicipal cooperation, transaction costs and 
political interests: Evidence from Spain 
 
Germà Bel and Xavier Fageda 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Many countries have instituted privatization of the delivery of local public services in the last 
decades of the twentieth century. Following this lead, an increasing number of municipalities 
turned the delivery of important local services, such as solid waste collection and water 
distribution, over to private providers. Private delivery of solid waste collection has increased 
with special intensity in the Scandinavian countries and has increased in other European 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Spain (Bel, 2006). Private distribution of water was 
systematically introduced in England and Wales in the early 1990s, and has significantly 
expanded throughout this decade in southern European countries such as France, Spain and 
Italy (Bel, 2006). Private delivery of water has been less common in the US and in Central and 
Northern Europe, where public delivery remains the hegemonic form. 
 
Nowadays, the geography of private delivery of local public services shows a wide diversity. On 
the one hand, we observe great diversity among countries in private delivery. On the other hand, 
we also find wide diversity in the extent of local privatization within each country. Hence, it is 
clear that –even if institutional factors at the national level can explain differences in levels of 
privatization- other factors must influence local government decisions on privatization. 
 
In the last two decades, many empirical works have addressed the question of why governments 
do, or do not, privatize local services. As shown in the recent survey by Bel and Fageda (2007), 
factors related to fiscal stress, cost reduction, political processes and ideological attitudes are the 
most common explanatory variables used in these studies. In this paper, we add new variables to 
examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors. Besides the standard 
consideration of variables reflecting political interests and ideological attitudes, we contribute to 
the literature on privatization decision by jointly considering the effects of politics and ideology. 
While political factors and ideological attitudes have been a part of previous studies, this study 
considers the interaction between the two.†  
 
In order to have a more complete picture of the decision process, we also include some 
alternatives to privatization, such as intermunicipal cooperation. Economies of scale or scope are 
considered one of the major advantages of local privatization (Donahue, 1989). Recent empirical 
evidence suggests that local governments can use intermunicipal cooperation to exploit 
economies of scale in solid waste collection (Warner and Hefetz, 2002a; Bel and Costas, 2006). 
One of the contributions of our empirical analysis is to test whether intermunicipal cooperation 
is an alternative to privatization.‡ As far as we know, ours is the first analysis to empirically 
consider intermunicipal cooperation as a potential explanatory factor in privatization.  
† Joint effects of political interests and ideological attitudes have been considered in Bel and Miralles 
(2006) when analyzing the economics and politics of local public services financing.  
‡ It is worthwhile noting that whereas intermunicipal cooperation in the US is not compatible with 
privatization (Warner and Hefetz, 2002a, 2002b; Levin and Tadelis, 2005), intermunicipal cooperation in 
Spain –as well as in most European countries- is compatible with private production. Because of this, 
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In our empirical analysis we use a 2003 sample of 559 Spanish municipalities. We use extensive 
information on two of the most relevant local services: solid waste collection and water 
distribution. Results from our estimates show that privatization is more common for solid waste 
collection than for water distribution. This finding is consistent with the fact that transaction 
costs are higher in water distribution because asset specificity is an important characteristic of 
water networks. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party employ 
private production more often regardless of the basic ideological orientation of the constituency. 
Our main conclusion here is that even if both politics and ideology influence the privatization 
decision, political interests have more influence than ideological attitudes.  
 
Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation is an alternative to local privatization, since 
intermunicipal cooperation is negatively related with privatization. This happens in solid waste 
collection, where municipalities can cooperate to exploit economies of scale without using 
private production to aggregate output. In the same way, intermunicipal cooperation is negatively 
related with privatization in water distribution, where municipalities can cooperate to exploit 
economies of density derived from a joint network without using private firms. Interestingly, 
cooperation in solid waste occurs in much smaller municipalities than is common for instances 
of joint deliver of water. This is consistent with the fact that economies of scale (related to 
output) are present in solid waste, whereas economies of density (related to network 
concentration) are present in water distribution. 
 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In section 2, we review the background provided 
by the empirical studies that analyze factors explaining local privatization. Section 3 presents our 
empirical strategy; here we provide information on data and sources, and we display and explain 
our empirical model. In Section 4, we present the results from the estimation of our empirical 
model and discuss the implications of our main results. Finally, in section 5 we summarize the 
main conclusions from our empirical analysis.  
 
Theoretical and Empirical Background. 
 
A growing body of theoretical work has discussed privatization of local services in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. Among the approaches most prone to endorsing privatization, 
Public Choice was the first approach to analyze choices in local services delivery. Seminal work 
by Niskanen (1971) proposed that when politicians and bureaucrats monopolize public services 
delivery, overproduction and inefficiency is likely to be the outcome. Savas (1987) extended the 
Public Choice approach to the privatization of local services, and suggested that policy makers 
extract political and/or material rents from managing local public services. Following this 
approach, we can infer two basic hypotheses: contracting out by local governments will improve 
technical efficiency and will provide lower costs in the delivery of services.   
 
Other theoretical approaches have also stressed the effect of costs in the service delivery choices 
of local governments. Transaction costs (administrative costs as well as costs from incomplete 
contracts) are important when a municipality choses to make or buy a service (Williamson 1979, 
1999) and factors such as monitoring and control play a central role (Sappington & Stiglitz, 
1987). From these theoretical works, it follows that the conditions that influence the level of 
transaction costs should be central in determining when a local service will be successfully 
decisions on engaging in intermunicipal cooperation and/or privatizing are not taken simultaneously. 
Section 3 deals in detail with this issue.  
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privatized. Hence, asset specificity and ease of measurement are key factors in determining 
contract completeness and the difficulty of performance monitoring (Brown and Potoski, 2003; 
Levin and Tadelis, 2007). Overall, the following core hypothesis emerges. Privatization is more 
likely to be chosen when transaction costs involved in the delivery of the service are not huge.  
 
Another important approach has emerged from property rights theory. The theory of incomplete 
contracts provides a useful analytical framework for studying situations in which contracting is a 
complex operation (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Within this framework, 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that--with private production--the manager has incentives 
to reduce costs without concern for quality erosion. Therefore, privatization will likely reduce 
costs, but can also deliver a lower quality of service. As stressed by Whinston (2003), one must 
confront the richness of predictions from property rights theory with the lack of available data to 
test them. Nonetheless, we can test some hypothesis within this framework. For instance, Hart, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose the hypothesis that politicians have two alternatives for rent-
seeking through service delivery. On one hand, those who look for political benefits from over-
employment might prefer public production. On the other hand, policy makers looking for 
political benefits from material transfers (such as campaign funding, funding of party 
organization expenses, etc.) might prefer privatization. In short, a core hypothesis emerges: 
service delivery choice will be pragmatic rather than ideological, and interest groups will have 
influence on the delivery choices made by local policy makers. 
 
While there is no absolute agreement on what factors might influence local privatization, we can 
sensibly group the hypotheses derived from the theoretical approaches mentioned above into 
two economic and two political sets of variables. Economically, governments may be inspired by 
some combination of fiscal restraints and anticipated lowered costs, while politically, leaders may 
be moved by loyalty to an ideology or a desire to win the support of key interest groups. 
 
Fiscal Restrictions  
 
Since the late 1970s, consistent with suggestions in Tiebout (1956), a taxpayers’ backlash toward 
increasing local exactions has emerged. In addition, an increasing number of supramunicipal 
legislators have introduced legislation limiting increases in local taxation and local budget debt. 
Most studies of privatization included fiscal variables designed to measure the effects of such 
restrictions, and the usual hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between fiscal constraints 
and privatization. The variables more commonly used to test the hypothesis that fiscal 
restrictions influence (positively) privatization are the following: tax burden, legal limitations on 
local tax levels and the size of transfers from the central to local governments.  
 
Early studies for the US, those where data collection was completed in the 1980s, frequently find 
that financial restrictions on local governments influence the choice of production form (e.g. 
Ferris, 1986; Feldman, 1986; Morgan, Hirlinger and England, 1988; Stein, 1990; Miranda, 1994; 
Hirsch, 1995). Among these early studies, only McGuire, Oshfeldt & van Cott (1987), and 
Chandler and Feuille (1994) infer from their data that fiscal stress is not a significant influence on 
the privatization choices of local governments. In more recent studies for the US, those where 
data collection occurred from 1992 to 2004, fiscal stress appears as a significant explanatory 
factor only in the works of Kodrzycki (1998), Brown, Potoski and van Slyke (2008) and Hebdon 
and Jalette (2008), which also includes observations for Canada. Among the studies for 
European countries, only Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melenberg (2003) find fiscal restrictions to be 
relevant in local service delivery choices. On the contrary, Bel and Miralles (2003) and Miralles 
(2006) find no influence from fiscal restrictions. It is worthwhile noting that taxpayers’ revolts 
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have been more moderate in Europe, and supramunicipal regulations limiting local taxation and 
debt have been less restrictive in Europe than in the US.  
 
Economic Efficiency 
 
Within the academic literature, two main explanations arise to link privatization to cost 
reduction. One proposes that privatization works by introducing competition where there is a 
public monopoly (Savas, 1987). Hence, the potential for reducing costs may be higher in larger 
and metropolitan urban areas where the availability of external providers is higher. Levin and 
Tadelis (2007) find that large and urban areas tend to externalize production to private firms 
more often, while smaller towns tend to externalize to public agencies. In the same way, results 
from the works of Warner and Hefetz (2002a) and Hebdon and Jalette (2007) imply that suburbs 
of metropolitan areas privatize more often than do rural areas. However, central cities privatize 
less than suburban areas. 
 
On the other hand, the possibility of exploiting economies of scale is especially important when 
the public service has been delivered over a suboptimal jurisdiction (Donahue, 1989). 
Privatization can be a useful tool in aggregating jurisdictions for the delivery of the service, 
because one firm can deliver services in several towns, thus operating at a more efficient scale. 
Thus, benefits from privatization due to the lower cost of operating at optimal scale may be 
especially important in smaller cities. The population of a city and demand for the service (when 
available) are the variables usually used for testing whether the possibility of exploiting scale 
economies is relevant to the privatization of local services. Evidence in studies that analyze just 
one service (rather than several) provides more support to the hypothesis that scale economies 
are a major determinant of privatization. Indeed, results from McGuire, Oshfeldt and van Cott 
(1987) for school buses and Feldman (1986) for urban buses support the hypothesis, as do the 
studies of Hirsch (1985), Stein (1990), Bel and Miralles (2003) and Dijkgraaf, Gradus and 
Melenberg  (2003) for solid waste collection. In contrast, most of the studies that consider a 
broad range of services do not find significant influence from scale variables. In sum, the 
possible exploitation of scale economies vary greatly between services. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that some recent studies pay special attention to the role of transaction 
costs in the delivery choices of local governments. In this sense, Menard and Saussier (2000), 
Levin and Tadelis (2007), Walls, Macauley and Anderson (2005), and Brown, Potoski and van 
Slyke (2008) argue that the likelihood that production will be externalized is higher for services 
with low specific assets and whose performance is easily measurable. Additionally, some studies 
(Nelson, 1997) argue that the positive relationship that they find between privatization and 
population homogeneity is due to the lower transaction costs associated with such homogeneity.   
 
Political Interests and Ideological Bias 
 
Non-economic factors, specifically political processes and ideological attitudes that might explain 
the decision to privatize local services,§ have also been adopted as variables. Within a democratic 
environment, two main motivations guide politicians in their decisions. On the one hand, 
§ Beyond  the decision to privatize local services, there is an interesting recent literature that analyzes the 
politics of the formation of public or private governments (Carr and Feiock, 2004). In this view, creating 
private governments is a solution to collective action problems that emerges because of a political process 
of crafting a relational contract among members of a community (Baer and Feiock, 2005). 
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politicians seek to win elections and obtain governmental positions. On the other hand, they 
have preferences for some policies over others according to their ideological attitudes.**  
 
Within the domain of political interests, the decision to privatize is dependent on the existence 
and the strength of pressure groups having a particular interest in the rents derived from a given 
form of service delivery. The variables more usually considered in the literature for capturing this 
effect are,†† the degree of unionization of public employees and the income level of households. 
In this field, it is commonly assumed that public employees and unions are in favor of internal 
production, while industrial interests have a greater preference for privatization. Early studies for 
the US usually find significant influence of interest groups: McGuire, Oshfeldt & van Cott 
(1987); Dubin and Navarro (1988), Miranda (1994), Chandler & Feuille (1994), Hirsch (1995), 
Greene (1996), Nelson (1997). More recent studies for the US find significant influence from 
unions (Warner and Hebdon, 2001; Levin and Tadelis, 2007) or high-income households 
(Warner and Hefetz, 2002a).‡‡ Miralles (2008) is the sole work that analyzes the influence of 
interest groups on service delivery choices in a European country. He finds that the relative 
strength of industrial users influences privatization, and that stronger industrial groups promote 
privatization.  
 
Ideology may also influence privatization. Since conservative parties have been associated with 
more pro-private business values, conservative governments should be positively associated with 
privatization. Similarly, because progressive parties are usually linked with collective values, they 
should be associated with public production. The influence of the ideology is usually captured in 
the literature through either the partisan affiliation of the local government or the percentage of 
progressive (or conservative) votes in elections. It is generally expected that there exists a 
negative relationship between privatization and progressive governments and the percentage of 
progressive votes. Among the studies for the US, ideology is found to be a relevant explanatory 
factor of privatization in the works by Dubin and Navarro (1988), Walls, Macauley & Anderson 
(2005) and Zullo (2005) for solid waste collection. Among the studies of European countries, 
Dijkgraaf, Gradus & Melenberg (2003) examining solid waste collection obtain a similar result, 
whereas Bel and Miralles (2003) and Ohlsson (2003) do not find a significant relationship.§§  
 
The hypotheses most frequently considered and tested in the empirical literature studying factors 
explaining local privatization can be summed up in four statements. First, we expect that 
** This double dimension of the politician in a democratic system has been named the citizen-candidate 
approach. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) offer theoretical insights; Levitt 
(1996) and Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004) offer empirical support. 
†† Other variable used in several studies is the percentage of public employees over population. On this 
we must recall that the determination of service delivery choices and the percentage of public employees 
is done simultaneously. Hence, the variable for the weight of public employees is statistically biased. 
Indeed, a more intense use of external suppliers implies per se a reduction in the number of public 
employees. Because of this, we do not consider here results obtained from using the variable percentage 
of public employees. A complete discussion of this methodological issue can be found in Bel and Fageda 
(2007) 
‡‡ Still for the case of the US, it is interesting to note that, following the proposition that politicians obtain 
the support of public employees when production of services is done internally, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1997) test the hypothesis that political patronage affects service delivery choices. In 
this way, they find that state laws that impose accountability requirements in contracting for personnel 
encourage privatization. However, later studies by Kodryzcki (1998); Walls, Macauley and Anderson 
(2005) and Zullo (2005) test this hypothesis and do not confirm these results. 
§§ Miralles (2006) obtains mixed results. Christoffersen and Paldam (2003) find no relation between 
ideology and privatization in their univariate study for Denmark.  
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privatization increases when fiscal constraints are more binding. Second, privatization may be 
aimed at reducing costs, either through competition or by the exploitation of scale economies. 
Third, the relative strength of different interest groups, such as unions or industrial business, 
influences local governments’ service delivery choices. Finally, conservative governments will be 
more prone to privatize local services, while progressive governments will be favor the public 
production of the service.  
 
The Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section, we provide information on the data available for our research and the 
corresponding sources. Next, we set up our empirical model. In doing so, we take into account 
the most important hypotheses established in the theoretical literature and tested in the empirical 
works that we have reviewed above.  
  
Data and Sources 
 
The sample is based on municipalities in Spain that filled out the Survey on Production of Local 
Services, a survey designed and carried out by the authors’ research unit. The survey asked Spanish 
municipalities of more than 2,000 inhabitants about two local services; solid waste collection and 
water distribution. The implementation of the survey has obtained data for 539 municipalities in 
the case of solid waste collection services and for 546 municipalities in the case of water 
distribution. The empirical analysis aggregates observations for both local services, so that each 
municipality of the sample may involve one or two observations. As to how representative our 
sample is, the municipalities included are all part of the 24.9% of all Spanish municipalities with 
population above 2,000, and the overall population included comprises 74.2% of the total 
population in municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. It is worthwhile noting that our 
sample includes all municipalities with population above 30,000 inhabitants.*** Information 
contained in the survey is for 2003 and includes the form of delivery (i.e. whether it is publicly or 
privately produced), the level (local or supralocal) at which the service is produced and, if 
applicable, the year when the service was contracted for the first time. 
 
We have obtained population data for each municipality in 2003 from the Spanish Statistics 
Institute. Information about the fiscal burden at the municipality level has been obtained from 
the Ministry of Treasury. Data for this variable refer to 2002 for municipalities of more than 
2,000 inhabitants. It must be noted that the fiscal burden a year prior to a decision may have an 
effect on the choice made by the local government. Data for the relative strength of industrial 
interests is available in the 2004 Spanish Economic Yearbook published by La Caixa, a Spanish 
savings bank. The web site of the Spanish Ministry of Domestic Affairs provides data for 
electoral results (national, regional and local) at the city/town level.  
 
The Empirical Model 
 
The empirical model considers aspects that have been commonly analyzed in the existing 
literature explaining local privatization. Thus, we include explanatory variables that capture the 
demand of local services at the municipal level, fiscal stress and interest group pressures. 
Additionally, we take into account the role of transaction costs. Finally, measures concerning 
*** Bel (2006) contains more detailed information on the sample. The rate of response for the survey was 
24,9% for municipalities over 2,000 inhabitants, and 100% for municipalities over 30,000 inhabitants. 
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political and ideological factors are included in different specifications of the equation. 
Altogether, the empirical model is as follows:  
 
Yi =  + 1popi + 2pop2i + 3coopi + 4transaction_costs + 5fiscal_burdeni + 6industrial_interestsi   
        + 7(political and ideological factors)i + i                                                                                                                         (1) 
 
where Yi is a dummy variable for the production form of the considered local service. This 
variable takes a value of 1 when the service is delivered under private production form setting, 
and it is 0 when delivery is public.  
 
We construct the explanatory variables included in equation (1) as follows. We include a variable 
for population of the municipality, pop. This variable is a proxy for the demand for the local 
service. In this regard, we expect that the relationship between the demand size at the local 
service level and the decision to privatize have an inverse-U shape (Bel & Miralles, 2003). The 
square of the population, pop2, appears in equation (1) to test for the inverse U-shape 
hypothesis.††† Indeed, small cities afford high supervision costs and modest quantitative potential 
benefits from privatization. Nevertheless, the largest municipalities do not exploit scale 
economies from privatization and they usually have strong managerial capacities.  
 
Additionally, we include a variable for municipalities that use intermunicipal cooperation to 
produce the local service, coop. We construct this variable as a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 when the service is produced at the supramunicipal level, while it stands at 0 when the 
service is produced at the municipal level. As we mentioned above, municipalities may use 
intermunicipal cooperation as an alternative means of exploiting scale economies.  
 
It is worthwhile noting that intermunicipal cooperation in Spain –as well as in most European 
countries- is compatible with private production. On the contrary, intermunicipal cooperation as 
it is understood in the US (e.g. Warner and Hefetz, 2002a, 2002b, Levin and Tadelis, 2007) is 
usually not compatible with private production, although it is seen as a form of contracting out. 
The main divergence between these different meanings for ‘intermunicipal cooperation’ is that in 
the US local governments contract out with other local government or public agencies. 
Therefore, delivery is in charge of an external (public) producer. In Spain, intermunicipal 
cooperation does not involve municipal governments contracting out the service to another 
government or public agency. Instead, they engage in city partnerships under a joint authority 
(either a supralocal institution –at county or province level-, or a single purpose agency) in 
governance of which all involved governments play a role.‡‡‡ Within this framework, the choice is 
made of using private production, public production or mixed firms for the delivery of the 
service. Hence, cooperation and privatization are not incompatible (Bel and Fageda 2006). In 
fact, production form choices made by municipalities that engage in cooperation are diverse. 
Among all municipalities that elect intermunicipal cooperation in solid waste collection, 51% use 
private production; 39% use public production and 10% use mixed firms. With respect to water 
††† Note that including this variable does not pose a problem of multicollinearity, which would only be an 
issue if the sample size were within a very small population range. It is worth noting that other works (e.g. 
Warner 2006) have found inverse U-shape curve for local privatization too. However, in Warner’s case, 
the curve is related to the geographical continuous metro-suburbs-rural, whereas in our case the curve 
relates to the city/town population. 
‡‡‡ Levin and Tadelis (2005) refer to exceptional cases of this type of city partnerships or public agencies 
partnerships in California, and they choose to consider this a special form of public sector contracting. 
Instead, they are much more frequent in continental Europe, and specially in France, the Netherlands and 
Spain (Kelly, 2007). 
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distribution, among all municipalities that elect intermunicipal cooperation 30% use private 
production, 62% use public production and 8% use mixed firms. Thus, it is clear that many 
communities that engage in municipal cooperation make a choice other than public production. 
 
We measure the role of transaction costs in local service delivery choices using a variable for the 
considered service, transaction_costs.  This variable is constructed as a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 when the service is water distribution and 0 when solid waste collection is being 
considered. As we mentioned above, the transaction costs of buying (and not producing 
internally) the service should be higher for water distribution than for solid waste collection. 
Indeed, the network nature of water distribution makes the specific assets associated to this 
service much more important than are those of solid waste removal. This is consistent with 
evidence in the literature showing that water distribution is characterized by higher transaction 
costs than solid waste collection (Brown and Potoski, 2005).§§§       
 
A variable for fiscal burden, fiscal_burden, is also considered. According to legal specifications in 
the Spanish budgetary process, we construct this variable as the sum of the financial 
expenditures (chapters 3 –interests- and 9 –amortization- of the expenditures budget) over the 
sum of ordinary revenues of the local government (chapters 1 through 5 of the revenues budget). 
Data on fiscal burden are not available for nine municipalities. Because of this, 18 observations 
have been excluded from the sample. Data for other nine municipalities are available only for 
2001. Recall that according to theoretical insights and empirical evidence, the decision to 
privatize may be more likely as the budget constraints of the municipality become more severe.  
 
We also control for the possible influence of industrial interests in favor of privatization, 
industrial_interests. This variable reflects industrial activity in the municipality by measuring the 
dimension of industrial activity in the city/town relative to the whole country level.  
 
Rather than using a single political variable, we seek to estimate the distinct effects of political 
and ideological influences by creating two variables, which can be looked at separately. In this 
way, we estimate three specifications of equation (1) and we differentiate them according to the 
political and ideological factors considered.    
 
Indeed, we first consider the political affiliation of the mayor, mayor. We construct this variable as 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the mayor belongs to a conservative party and 0 
when the mayor belongs to a progressive party. We exclude from this estimation those 
municipalities whose mayors do not belong to a standard political party (parliamentary 
representation either at national or regional -state- level), since we cannot precisely infer where 
such mayors lie on the conservative / progressive continuum. We cannot include the variable of 
independent mayors as a dummy variable in equation (1) because mayors in this set are very 
§§§ In this way, Brown and Potoski (2005) measure asset specificity and ease of measurement for 64 local 
services in the US. They build an indicator ranging from one (low specificity, or easy measurement) and 5 
(high specificity, and difficult measurement). Concerning the services we study here, they find asset 
specificity of 3.94 and ease of measurement 2.44 for water distribution, whereas assets specificity is 3.00 
and ease of measurement 2.06 for residential solid waste collection. For commercial solid waste collection 
their ratings are 3.06 and 1.97 respectively (Brown and Potoski, 2005: 336-337). More recently, Levin and 
Tadelis (2007) have built indicators on contract difficulty, as perceived by a sample of city managers. They 
find that services related to water contract difficulty is over the average, whereas for all services related to 
waste (collection as well as disposal) contract difficulty is below the average. Finally, the literature 
provides evidence that contract terms are longer in water are longer than in solid waste collection (Bel 
2006, Johnson, McCormally and Moore 2002), thus reflecting higher relevance of sunk costs in water. 
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divergent from the ideological point of view. Moreover, quite often the independent (from the 
conventional parties) lists**** are based on a strong personality of the candidate to mayor (the 
person in the top position in the list). There is a minority of municipalities with ‘independent’ 
mayor: only 57, which represents 10.2% of the municipalities in our sample (559). The frequency 
of independent mayors is much higher in the less populated municipalities (13.1% of 
municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants). It decreases in the intermediate municipalities (8.9% of 
municipalities between 20,000 and 50,000), and reaching the lowest frequency in the largest cities 
(6.1% in municipalities above 50,000). 
 
Second, we consider the ideological position of the constituency in national elections, ideology. We 
construct this variable by measuring the mean percentage of votes obtained by conservative 
parties in the national elections of 2000 and 2004. In our view, the ideology of the constituency 
is reflected in its stance in national elections. This is so especially if we remember that Spain has 
a parliamentary system, and the prime minister is elected by the Parliament. Hence, national 
elections are the most ideologically motivated elections in Spain. One might wonder whether 
elections to the European parliament are more ideologically driven than national elections. 
However, abstention in European elections (54.86% in 2004) is very important, and substantially 
higher than abstention in national elections (24.34% in 2004). No doubt, national election is 
widely seen as the most important election in Spain.  
 
On the other hand, the political affiliation of the mayor may differ from the basic ideology the 
constituency demonstrates in national elections. In fact, a mayor’s affiliation might also depend 
on the relative strength of interest groups such as industrial unions, trade unions, and coalitions 
at the local level, etc. In this regard, it is worth noting that the correlation between the variables 
mayor and ideology is 0.53. This indicates that we should not consider these two variables jointly 
since multicollineality may prevent identifying each individual effect. However, these variables 
may be capturing different aspects of the decision since they are far from being identical. ††††   
 
Furthermore, we construct complex political variables that combine mayor and ideology variables. 
Hence the following dummies are created: C-C: Conservative mayor – Conservative 
constituency, C-P: Conservative mayor – Progressive constituency, P-C: Progressive mayor – 
Conservative constituency, P-P: Progressive mayor – Progressive constituency. A conservative 
constituency is one that gives conservative parties a majority of votes in national elections (and 
the opposite for progressive constituency). Concerning the probability of privatization, we 
expect that CC>CP>PC>PP. Indeed, municipalities with-conservative mayors will privatize 
more than municipalities with progressive mayors regardless of the ideological stance of the 
constituency. This would imply that interest groups might be successful in promoting 
privatization through a conservative mayor, even if the constituency is progressive oriented (and 
the opposite).  
 
Table 1 summarizes the description of the variables used in the empirical analysis and their 
expected relationship with the form of production used by local governments. 
**** It is worth noting that local elections in Spain are based on party lists. In this way, independent parties 
are those political parties that are strictly local. The members of the city council are elected on 
proportional basis (corrected by means of d’Hondt system). The election of the mayor is not direct: after 
being elected, the members of the city council will elect the mayor in the first meeting of the local council 
after election. An absolute majority (50% + 1) of votes from the city counsel members is required to be 
elected as mayor in the first round. If no candidate obtains such a majority, then the top member of the 
list that obtained the largest fraction of votes in the local election is automatically elected as mayor.   
†††† Otherwise, the correlation between the variables industrial_interests and major is low.   
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Insert table 1 about here 
 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for solid waste collection and water distribution 
concerning the form of production (private production, public production and mixed firm 
production)‡‡‡‡ and the level at which the service is produced (local or supralocal). It can be seen 
that private production is more common for solid waste collection than for water distribution.  
  
Insert table 2 about here 
  
Although production at the supramunicipal level is more common for solid waste collection, 
around 25 percent of municipalities use intermunicipal cooperation in the delivery of water 
distribution. In addition, municipalities that cooperate are less likely to use private production in 
water or solid waste services than are those that do not cooperate.  
 
To this point, it is worth noting that the mean population size of municipalities that cooperate is 
much lower for solid waste collection than for water distribution. This can be explained by the 
different cost structures of these services. Fixed assets are required for producing both services 
but water distribution has network features that are associated to a high amount of sunk 
investments. In this regard, scale economies affect solid waste collection, while density 
economies are critical for water distribution. Scale economies implies that unit costs are reduced 
when the amount of output produced increases. Such effect may be approximated by the 
amount of inhabitants from municipalities to which the producer delivers the service. On the 
contrary, density economies implies that unit costs are reduced when population density 
concerning the municipalities to which the producer delivers the service is higher.  
 
Hence, we expect inter-municipal cooperation for water distribution to take place more 
frequently between nearby municipalities located in major urban areas. Interestingly enough, our 
data show that Levin and Tadelis’s (2007) finding that large municipalities (in terms of 
population) are more prone to contract out whereas small municipalities are more prone to use 
intermunicipal cooperation is heavily dependent on the nature of the potential scale economies 
involved in the specific service. In this way, our data for solid waste are consistent with Levin 
and Tadelis (2007), but our data on water distribution are not. In the latter case, economies of 
density are more relevant than scale economies. Economies of density emerge in metropolitan 
areas with more populated contiguous municipalities, rather than in non-metropolitan areas 
where population is much lower on average and municipalities cannot share an existing network 
for urban water distribution. 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of both continuous and discrete variables used to 
estimate our model. Concerning the continuous variables, our sample contains a large diversity 
‡‡‡‡ We exclude from the estimation those observations in which a mixed firm is in charge of delivering 
the service. Observations excluded are 76, which represents 7% of the sample. Mixed firms are firms 
whose stakeholders are both the corresponding governments and private investors. Such mixed 
public/private firms are usual in many European continental countries, but they are a very rare 
organizational form in countries like the US (Warner and Bel, 2008). Whenever a mixed firm is involved, 
we are not able to make clear standard inferences about the ownership status of the producer. In this way, 
we do not know with precision the structure of the firm ownership. Including mixed firms in the 
estimation would distort the analysis of the choice between public and private form of production since 
mixed firms are a hybrid organizational form. 
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of municipalities in terms of population size, fiscal burden, the strength of industrial interests, 
mayor’s party affiliation,§§§§ and ideology. Furthermore, data from table 3 show that a high 
number of municipalities have privatized the production of the local service. In addition to this, 
around one third of the municipalities use intermunicipal cooperation, which can be seen as an 
organizational administrative form that allows exploiting scale economies or scope economies. 
  
Insert table 3 about here 
 
 
Interestingly, the political affiliation of the mayor differs from the ideological orientation of the 
constituency in national elections in more than 25 percent of the municipalities of the sample. In 
our view, there are several and compatible reasons why there can be a conservative (progressive) 
mayor in a progressive (conservative) jurisdiction. Strong personal characteristics can play a role, 
as well as the fact that local policy agendas are different from national policy agendas. Besides, 
proportional system with lists and non-direct election of mayor can result in a more complex city 
council, and different types of coalition forming to elect a mayor. All this factors are likely to be 
more influential in those jurisdictions where does not exist a large ideological majority. This can 
be seen in table 4, where basic information on the mayor/ideology distribution in the sample is 
displayed. First, average population in municipalities where mayor’s affiliation and ideological 
majority (CP and PC) are not the same is smaller than average population in municipalities where 
mayor’s party and ideology are coincident (CC and PP). More importantly, average ideological 
results in CP and PC municipalities are notably more moderate than those in CC and PP 
municipalities, where the respective ideological majority is more significant.  
 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
 
 
The Empirical Results 
 
The estimation is made using the probit technique since the dependent variable is of a discrete 
nature. Table 5 shows the results of the estimation for the different specifications of equation 
(1).  
 
 
Insert table 5 about here 
 
 
Results of the estimates show that the size of the municipality in terms of population does not 
have a strong effect on the probability of using private firms for producing the service. The fact 
is that we find that the variables related to population have the expected sign: privatization 
increases with population (+ sign for pop), but the intensity of that effect decreases as long as 
population increases (– sign for pop2). However, the coefficients we find are not significantly 
different from zero. One exception to this is that the variable for the square of population is 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level in the specification that uses dummy variables that 
combine political and ideological factors. This implies that the largest municipalities tend to 
privatize less often because they are large enough to completely exploit scale economies.  
§§§§ After pooling the data for the two considered local services, the number of observations excluded 
from our sample in the estimations with the variable ‘mayor’ has been 95. We had initially 111 
observations belonging to municipalities with ‘independent mayor’. However, 16 of them had already 
been excluded because of mixed firms or not availability of fiscal data. 
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However, it is clear that privatization is not the unique choice available to local governments for 
exploiting scale or density economies. On the contrary, privatization is less likely when the 
production of the local service is made at the supramunicipal level.***** Hence, we can infer that 
many local governments prefer to use intermunicipal cooperation rather than privatization to 
exploit scale economies. Indeed, intermunicipal cooperation also allows small municipalities to 
aggregate demand to achieve a scale of production higher than the minimum efficient one. In 
such a case, those small municipalities obtain less benefit from privatizing the service, since 
transaction costs are likely higher for contracting out to a private firm than for joining a joint 
powers authority.  
 
We also find that privatization is less likely for water distribution than for solid waste collection, 
given the value of the other explanatory variables related to the characteristics of municipalities. 
A sensible explanation for this result is that transaction costs are higher for water distribution, so 
local governments may have fewer incentives for using private firms in order to produce this 
service. Thus, we find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that privatization will be less likely in 
the case of services with larger transaction costs.  
 
A local government’s service delivery choices are not clearly influenced by its financial situation. 
The sign of the coefficient of this variable is positive, thus suggesting the expected positive 
relation between financial restrictions and privatization. However, the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. As we mention above, this ‘no significant effect’ result is much 
more frequent in empirical analysis for European countries, where supramunicipal regulations 
imposing restrictions on local budgetary decisions are less restrictive.  
 
We do not find a substantial effect from the relative strength of local industrial groups on the 
privatization decision of local governments. The sign of the coefficient is the expected positive 
one but it is highly non-significant. It may be that industrial lobbying is more an action of those 
private players in the market for local services than a product of local industrial groups. Our 
variable reflects only local industrial groups, and this could explain its lack of statistical 
significance. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the results in Miralles (2008) are relative to 
water distribution, whereas our results relate to solid waste collection. 
 
On the contrary, the variables that capture political and ideological factors play a significant role 
in explaining the decision to privatize local services.††††† Indeed, we find that local governments 
where the mayor belongs to a conservative party privatize the production of local services more 
***** One could argue that the variable for intermunicipal cooperation implies an endogeneity bias as the 
decision to cooperate could be made simultaneously with the decision of contracting out the service. 
However, as we mention above, intermunicipal cooperation as it is understood in Europe is a decision 
that can be undertaken under any production form setting. Thus, the possible endogeneity bias is not an 
issue in our context.  
††††† In the empirical analysis, we exclude observations in municipalities that first externalized the delivery 
of the local services considered before local democracy was restored in Spain in 1979. Observations 
excluded are 78, which represents 7.2% of the sample. Inclusion of service delivery choices made in the 
authoritarian political context of Franco’s dictatorship might distort the analysis of explanatory factors, 
particularly concerning the political factors, since these decisions were not taken within a democratic 
decision context. Many of these concessions, particularly on water distribution, were still in place in the 
early 2000’s. Considering in the estimation municipalities that first externalized the service before 
democracy was restored yields similar results to those obtained in our analysis. Political variables show 
less robust results, even if they keep significance.
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often (specification 1 of equation (1)). In addition, local governments with conservative 
constituencies also seem to privatize service delivery more commonly (specification 2 of 
equation (1)). However, the dummy variables that combine both political and ideological factors 
allow us to obtain further insights into this issue (specification 3 of equation (1)). Indeed, local 
governments with conservative mayors privatize more often regardless of the ideological 
orientation of the constituency.‡‡‡‡‡ This shows that political interests that influence the result of 
local elections are more important than the basic ideological stance of the constituency.  
 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 display the results from estimating equation (1) for sub-samples of 
municipalities according to different population ranges. In this way, we consider small 
municipalities to be those with less than 20,000 inhabitants, medium-sized municipalities are 
municipalities whose population ranges from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants and large 
municipalities are those with more than 50,000 inhabitants.  
 
 
Insert  Table 6  
 
Insert  Table 7 
 
Insert Table 8 
 
 
For all sub-samples of municipalities, we find that privatization is chosen less commonly when 
the local service is delivered at the supramunicipal level. Additionally, privatization takes place 
less often for water distribution than for solid waste collection. The results confirm those 
previously obtained for the whole sample of municipalities. Intermunicipal cooperation emerges 
as an alternative organizational form to privatization regardless the size of the municipality. In 
the same way, the fact that transaction costs associated to water distribution are higher is relevant 
for both small and large municipalities.   
 
Concerning small municipalities, we find that the relationship between privatization and 
population has the expected inverse U-shaped form. Indeed, the variables for population and the 
square of population are statistically significant with the expected sign. Fiscal restrictions also 
seem to condition delivery choices of these municipalities given that the variable for fiscal stress 
is statistically significant (with a positive sign) in two of the specifications of equation (1). On the 
contrary, political and ideological factors are not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications of our equation for explanatory factors of local privatization. This latter result is 
also obtained when considering medium-sized municipalities. The relationship between 
population and privatization do not seem to be a relevant factor for medium-sized and large 
municipalities. This is also the case with respect to the influence of fiscal burden on local 
governments’ delivery choices. Importantly, politics and ideology are both relevant factors 
explaining local privatization for large municipalities.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that delivery choices of local governments are more pragmatically 
oriented for small municipalities, while politics and ideology play a major role for governments 
of large municipalities. Indeed, small municipalities may have difficulties in generating fiscal 
‡‡‡‡‡ We exclude from the estimation the following dummy variable that combines political and ideological 
factors: P-P: Progressive major – Progressive constituency. We exclude this variable from the estimation 
to avoid perfect multicollineality with the other dummy variables for political and ideological factors. This 
variable is set as the reference variable for these other dummy variables.  
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revenues and the quantitative advantages of privatization should be modest. In addition to this, it 
is sensible to argue that the politics of large cities is more dependent on ideological orientation, 
while personal interaction between politicians and citizens is a key issue in small towns.    
 
Results from the estimation for sub-samples of municipalities according to different population 
ranges suggest significant differences for small and large municipalities. This may imply that 
different equations are needed to examine local governments’ service delivery choices. In this 
way, we have implemented the Chow F-test for structural change considering the residuals of the 
estimation for the whole sample of municipalities, and the residuals of the estimation for 
municipalities with more (and less) of 20,000 inhabitants. The Chow test is a test of whether the 
coefficients in two equations on different data are equal. Within our context, under the null 
hypothesis there does not exist significant differences in the coefficients of the equations for 
municipalities with more (and less) of 20,000 inhabitants. However, the value obtained is about 
100 that is highly above the 1 per cent critical values of the corresponding F-statistic. Thus, 
empirical analyses on factors explaining local privatization must account for the size distribution 
concerning the sample of municipalities used.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has developed an empirical model aimed to identify factors explaining local 
governments’ service delivery choices in Spain. In this way, we have taken advantage of a rich 
data set using a survey for Spanish municipalities larger than 2,000 inhabitants concerning two 
very relevant local services; solid waste collection and water distribution.  
 
The empirical model has considered variables related to fiscal stress, cost reduction and political 
and ideological factors. We contribute to the previous literature in several ways. There is an 
agreement that transaction costs are relevant in explaining local government’s service delivery 
choices. However, few empirical works have been able to capture their effect. In our paper, we 
capture the effect of transaction costs using a new variable that differentiates between services 
associated with different levels of transaction costs.  
 
In addition to this, ours is the first empirical analysis that jointly considers the influence of 
politics and ideology on local government choices by using measures that account for the 
political affiliation of the mayor, the ideological standpoint of the constituency and the joint 
effect of both. We argue that ideology is mainly captured by the constituency stance in national 
election, while the political affiliation of the mayor may well depend on the relative strength of 
interest groups. 
 
Finally, this is the first empirical analysis considering intermunicipal cooperation as an 
explanatory factor for local privatization. Indeed, local governments may use intermunicipal 
cooperation as an alternative organizational form to privatization for reducing costs by exploiting 
scale or density economies.   
 
Our main empirical findings are as follows. We find that private production is less common for 
water distribution than for solid waste collection, given the value of variables for the 
characteristics of the municipalities. From this result, we infer that transaction costs matters in 
explaining why local governments adopt or reject contracting out of local service, since 
transaction costs are higher in the case of water distribution.  
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We also obtain evidence that politics and ideology are relevant explanatory factors for local 
governments’ service delivery choices. We also find that the effect of political interest is more 
important than the effect of ideological attitudes. Conservative mayors use private production 
more often regardless of the ideological position of their constituencies. 
 
Furthermore, our results show that intermunicipal cooperation is an alternative to privatization 
for exploiting scale or density economies. Private production is much less frequent under 
intermunicipal cooperation, and intermunicipal cooperation negatively influences privatization. 
 
Our research provides new insights into the factors influencing the decision to privatize local 
services. It also suggests interesting questions for future research. We find it particularly 
compelling to consider variables related to quality of services, although measurement of this 
variable for empirical work has proven to be a very difficult task. In addition, studying the 
dynamics of mixed firms can provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics of local 
government reform. Future research will devote more attention to these issues. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Summary of variables and hypothesis 
Set of variables Variable Description  Hypothesis 
Cost and 
efficiency 
pop 
 
Local population 
 
Privatization increases with 
population (+)  
 pop2 
 
Square of local population The intensity of the 
population effect decreases as 
population increases (–)  
 transaction_costs Dummy variable ( 1= water  distribution, 0 
= solid waste collection) 
Privatization decreases with 
higher transaction costs (-) 
Fiscal stress fiscal_burden Sum of financial expenditures over sum of 
ordinary revenues of the local government  
Privatization increases with 
higher fiscal burden (+) 
Intermunicipal 
cooperation 
Coop Dummy variable (1 = service produced at 
the supra-municipal level, 0 at the municipal 
level) 
Privatization decreases with 
intermunicipal cooperation (-)
Political and 
ideological factors 
industrial_interests 
 
Relative share of industrial activity in the 
city/town. 
Privatization increases with 
higher relative strength of 
industrial interests (+) 
 mayor 
 
Dummy variable ( 1 = mayor belongs to a 
conservative party, 0 = mayor belongs to a 
progressive party 
Privatization increases with 
mayors from a conservative 
party (+) 
 ideology 
 
Percentage of votes obtained by rigth wing 
parties in the national elections  
Privatization increases with a 
conservative orientation of 
the constituency (+) 
 CC 
 
Conservative mayor – Conservative 
constituency 
CC > CP > PC > PP 
 CP 
 
Conservative mayor – Progressive 
constituency 
CC > CP > PC > PP 
 PC  
 
Progressive mayor – Conservative 
constituency 
CC > CP > PC > PP 
 PP Progressive mayor – Progressive 
constituency 
CC > CP > PC > PP 
 
 
Table 2. Selected descriptive statistics for individual services 
Solid waste collection 
 Percentage of 
municipalities 
Mean 
population 
Standard deviation 
population 
Private production 65.68 57,999.48 192,176.8 
Public production 29.68 45,459.94 82,003.72 
Mixed firm production 4.64 57,985.60 125,847.4 
Cooperation at supramunicipal level 29.31 20,128.18 28,957.32 
Production form (only 
municipalities that cooperate) 
Private production 
Public production 
Mixed firm production 
 
 
51.27 
38.61 
10.13 
 
 
23,330.89 
17,219.11 
15,003.69 
 
 
37,044.54 
16,622.05 
15,315.46 
Water Distribution 
 Percentage of 
municipalities 
Mean 
population 
Standard deviation 
population 
Private production 49.82 46,371.95 110,140.9 
Public production 40.84 64,809.56 223,654.4 
Mixed firm production 9.34 81,020.10 132,981.1 
Cooperation at supramunicipal level 24.36 79,273.14 300,217.3 
Production form (only 
municipalities that cooperate) 
Private production 
Public production 
Mixed firm production  
 
 
30.08 
61.65 
8.27 
 
 
81,571.85 
86,443.52 
17,465.27 
 
 
249,493.04 
341,043.94 
17,324.17 
Source: Authors’ 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                               Working Papers 2008/04, 23 pages
21
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables in the model 
 
Continuous variables Mean Standard Deviat. Min Max 
Pop 54,088.54 166,644.1 2,033 3,092,759 
Fiscal_burden 0.087 0.068 0.00002 0.823 
Industrial_interests 0.0025 0.0028 0.0002 0.030 
Ideology 0.488 0.107 0.18 0.80 
     
Discrete variables Percent 1 Percent 0 N  
Production form (1= private, 0= public,) 62.08 37.92 1,010  
coop. (1=production at the supramunicipal level, 
0=production at the municipal level) 
26.82 73.18 1,085  
transaction_costs (1=water distribution, 0=solid 
waste collection 
50.32 49.68 1,085  
Mayor (1= Conservative mayor, 0= Progressive 
mayor) 
44.34 55.66 972  
CC (1= Conservative mayor – Conservative 
constituency, 0=other 
 
33.13 66.87 972  
CP  (1= Conservative mayor – Progressive 
constituency, 0=other 
 
11.21 88.79 972  
PC  (1= Progressive mayor – Conservative 
constituency, 0=other 
13.99 86.01 972  
PP  (1= Progressive mayor – Progressive 
constituency, 0=other) 
41.67 58.33 972  
Source: Authors’ 
 
 
 
Table 4. Distribution of municipalities according to the mayor affiliation/ideological majority combination  
 
 Conservative 
Mayor - 
Conservative. 
Constituency 
CC 
Progressive 
mayor – 
Conservative 
constituency 
PC 
T-statistic 
(Average 
differences) 
Conservative 
mayor – 
Progressive 
constituency 
CP 
Progressive 
mayor – 
Progressive 
constituency 
PP 
T-statistic 
(Average 
differences) 
Number municipalities 169 71  56 206  
Average population 67,716 39,353 1.397 53,184 53,973 0.045 
(Standard deviation) (251,821) (51,342)  (111,596) (129,181)  
Average ideological majority 0.58142 0.54866 4.116*** 0.45889 0.39495 8.211*** 
(Standard deviation)  (0.0686) (0.0502)  (0.0427) (0.0765)  
Note 1: percentages in ‘average ideological majority’ are to be read as follows: 0.58142 in CC means that the 
conservative parties obtained 58.142% of votes in the CC municipalities (as average) in the national elections of 
2000 and 2004.  
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
Source: Authors’ 
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Table 5. Estimates of the equation of factors explaining local privatization estimates (probit) 
 Specification (1): 
mayor 
Specification (2): 
ideology 
Specification (3): combined 
mayor-ideology 
Pop 1.91e-06 (2.23e-06) 8.93e-07 (2.12e-06) 1.83e-06 (2.22e-06) 
pop2 -1.59e-11 (8.59e-12) -1.28e-11 (8.22e-12) -1.55e-11 (8.55e-12)* 
Coop -0.77 (0.10)*** -0.70 (0.09)*** -0.76 (0.10)*** 
Transaction_costs -0.41 (0.09)*** -0.41 (0.09)*** -0.42 (0.09)*** 
fiscal_burden 0.89 (0.67) 0.78 (0.66) 0.90 (0.67) 
Industrial_interests 10.86 (17.20) 17.46 (15.63) 9.68 (17.49) 
Intercept 0.47 (0.12)*** 0.10 (0.23) 0.46 (0.13)*** 
Mayor 0.20 (0.09)** - - 
Ideology - 0.99 (0.41)** - 
CC 
CP 
PC 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.18 (0.11)* 
0.28 (0.16)* 
0.03 (0.13) 
N 
Pseudo R2 
2 (joint sig.) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
818 
0.08 
82.11*** 
-505.69 
913 
0.08 
85.96*** 
-565.008 
818 
0.08 
82.49*** 
-505.47 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
 
Table 6. Estimates of the equation of factors explaining local privatization estimates (probit). 
(Municipalities with less than 20,000 habitants) 
 Specification (1): 
mayor 
Specification (2): 
ideology 
Specification (3): combined 
mayor-ideology 
Pop 0.00011 (5.5e-05)** 0.00015 (5.51e-05)*** 0.00011 (5.5e-05)** 
pop2 -4.07e-09 (2.65e-09) -6.26e-09 (2.46e-09)** -4.00e-09 (2.67e-09) 
Coop -0.68 (0.15)*** -0.56 (0.14)*** -0.68 (0.15)*** 
transaction_costs -0.41 (0.13)*** -0.41 (0.12)*** -0.41 (0.13)*** 
fiscal_burden 1.77 (1.03)* 1.47 (1.01) 1.83 (1.05)* 
Industrial_interests 4.29 (21.15) 13.74 (18.83) 2.61 (21.65) 
Intercept -0.20 (0.28) -0.54 (0.38) -0.19 (0.31)*** 
Mayor 0.10 (0.13) - - 
Ideology - 0.64 (0.54) - 
CC 
CP 
PC 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.07 (0.15) 
0.21 (0.22) 
0.04 (0.20) 
N 
Pseudo R2 
2 (joint sig.) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
407 
0.07 
36.81*** 
-255.79 
469 
0.07 
38.42*** 
-294.227 
407 
0.07 
36.96*** 
-255.56 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
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Table 7. Estimates of the equation of factors explaining local privatization estimates (probit). 
(Municipalities whose population ranges from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants) 
 Specification (1): 
mayor 
Specification (2): 
ideology 
Specification (3): combined 
mayor-ideology 
Pop 5.35e-05 (9.66e-05) 0.00012 (9.12e-05) 7.26e-05 (9.75e-05) 
pop2 -1.27e-09 (1.44e-09) -2.19e-09 (1.36e-09) -1.57e-09 (1.45e-09) 
Coop -0.75 (0.20)*** -0.74 (0.19)*** -0.75 (0.20)*** 
Transaction_costs -0.42 (0.18)** -0.35 (0.17)** -0.41 (0.17)** 
fiscal_burden -0.20 (1.33) -0.15 (1.33) -0.22 (1.35) 
Industrial_interests 54.49 (39.28) 56.78 (35.15) 62.08 (36.63)* 
Intercept 0.22 (1.58)*** -1.47 (1.56) -0.01 (1.60) 
Mayor 0.20 (0.18) - - 
Ideology - 1.13 (0.77) - 
CC 
CP 
PC 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.22 (0.22) 
-0.16 (0.32) 
-0.29 (0.24) 
N 
Pseudo R2 
2 (joint sig.) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
230 
0.11 
28.96*** 
-133.60 
252 
0.10 
28.86*** 
-147.47 
230 
0.12 
31.57*** 
-255.56 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Estimates of the equation of factors explaining local privatization estimates (probit). 
(Municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants) 
 Specification (1): 
mayor 
Specification (2): 
ideology 
Specification (3): combined 
mayor-ideology 
Pop -1.37e-06 (4.09e-06) -1.23e-06 (4.39e-06) -2.01e-06 (3.37e-06) 
pop2 -7.36e-12 (1.03e-11) -7.29e-12 (1.16e-11) -5.51e-12 (7.32e-12) 
Coop -1.02 (0.26)*** -1.10 (0.27)*** -1.05 (0.26)*** 
Transaction_costs -0.42 (0.20)** -0.44 (0.20)** -0.44 (0.21)** 
fiscal_burden 0.07 (1.23) -0.10 (1.20) 0.02 (1.24) 
Industrial_interests 18.96 (83.23) 37.97 (82.78) 21.46 (82.44) 
Intercept 0.73 (0.37)** -0.68 (0.61) 0.64 (0.35)* 
Mayor 0.38 (0.21)* - - 
Ideology - 3.12 (1.07)*** - 
CC 
CP 
PC 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.47 (0.24)** 
0.76 (0.37)** 
0.59 (0.32)* 
N 
Pseudo R2 
2 (joint sig.) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
181 
0.17 
30.66*** 
-102.63 
192 
0.18 
32.52*** 
-107.16 
181 
0.18 
33.03*** 
-100.57 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
